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Abstract. Companies struggle with timely project execution despite employing sophis-
ticated management methods. Although help across projects is critical for time perfor-
mance, it has not been explicitly incorporated into project management (PM) systems. We
model a PM system, based on an innovative real-life practice, that both incorporates and
shapes project managers’ helping behavior. A help process is at the core of this system, in
which project managers may ask for and provide help while top management facilitates
such exchanges. We find that companies should take a nuanced approach when designing
help exchange and time-based incentives in tandem. A company that faces high project
rewards after delays and highly effective help can benefit from inducing help because
doing so enables the pursuit of projects it might abandon if delayed or even at the out-
set. The formal help process delivers value by creating and exploiting interdependencies
between projects. These interdependencies allow project prioritization by inducing differ-
ent effort levels in otherwise identical projects. A help process also allows the company to
“tune” the timing of efforts by front-loading or back-loading project work. The benefits of
a help system accrue through cost efficiencies, increased probability of success under help,
and intertemporal incentive effects that encourage early efforts. However, because the help
process creates the opportunity for free riding, a help system is not always recommended
and a no-help system may perform better, especially when there are low project rewards
after delay and low opportunity costs for project work.
Keywords: project management • new product development • cooperative behavior
1. Introduction
Timely project completion is crucial for firms in com-
petitive markets (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Cohen
et al. 1996, Loch and Kavadias 2011). Across industries,
however, firms are plagued by project delays. Mitchell
(2006) reports that 49% of all information technology
projects are late, overrunning their intended duration
by 63% on average; according to Assaf and Al-Hejji
(2006), 70% of large construction projects exhibit an
average time overrun of 30%. Even the tightly con-
trolled OEM (original equipment manufacturer) auto-
motive suppliers surveyed byHartley et al. (1997) com-
plete 17% of their projects late and with an average
delay of 12%. Cooperative behavior across projects is
one success factor in timely project completion that has
been suggested by project practitioners (PMI 2013) and
also by empirical innovation researchers (Sivadas and
Dwyer 2000, Hoegl et al. 2004). Yet current approaches
remain vague (if not altogether silent) about just how
to incorporate cooperative behavior into a project man-
agement (PM) system. Most notably, the widely usedA
Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge rele-
gates the encouragement of help to the realm of leader-
ship (PMI 2013, chap. 9.3) but fails to describe any PM
processes for attaining and harnessing help.
In this paper we explicitly study when, how, and
why cross-project help should be embedded into the
formal building blocks of a project management sys-
tem. Our parsimonious model is inspired by and
grounded in a cooperative PM system implemented
at Roto Frank AG (hereafter Roto), a window and
solar technology manufacturer based in Germany. In
December 2009, this company implemented a system
designed to create and exploit cross-project help by
launching an innovative PM practice that formalized
mutual help at the project execution level. In particular,
project engineers at Roto are encouraged to publicize
emerging problems that threaten on-time completion
of their task by “raising a red card”—whichmeans that
troubled project engineers actually put a small red flag
on top of their work desks. This change reflects the
lean management principle of visualization: the idea of
signaling work progress and making problems observ-
able to everyone on the work floor.
To encourage engineers’ use of the red cards, Roto’s
top management promised to facilitate support for
the troubled project engineer by enlisting the help of
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colleagues working on other projects, who would form
a red-card team in charge of resolving the issue. (We shall
ease the exposition by using masculine and feminine
pronouns for agentswho, respectively, request andpro-
vide help.) Members of a red-card team are selected for
their technical expertise and availability—that is, they
are recruited only from projects that are on schedule
and can afford to provide some engineering help. Other
than this modification of project execution processes,
Roto’s PM system remained unchanged. In particu-
lar, the project planning that annually assigns projects
to project managers was not altered; neither was the
principle changed that project managers and engineers
work on secondary (nonproject) tasks when not busy
with their main projects.
After implementing the red-card system, Roto dem-
onstrated three consecutive years of increased project
performance as measured by improved deadline relia-
bility and reduced expenditures on late tool changes.
The average number of milestone delays per project
fell from 60 in 2009 to 30 in 2012 (out of 120 mile-
stones per project on average), and expenses for late tool
changes declined 55% over that time period—during
which project portfolios remained comparable in terms
of bothquantity (20projects per year) andquality (high-
end roof windows requiring six worker years of labor
input). For more details, see Sting et al. (2015).
The model developed here allows us to analyze and
generalize the central new concept of Roto’s PM sys-
tem, the formal help process, in order to explore when
and how it can be used to achieve success in different
project environments.We adopt Roto’s definition of the
operative term: help is exchanged when a manager of
one project deploys effort and resources to cooperate
on another manager’s project. A formal help process—
as implemented by Roto—establishes clear guidelines
for project managers who seek problem-solving sup-
port and also gives the company a way to monitor and
reward the provision of such help.
Our paper is the first to model help in a multiproject
settingwhere timely completionmatters. In doing so, it
makes contributions by answering three critical ques-
tions, namely, when, how, and why a company should
encourage help across projects. First, we build a com-
prehensive framework that characterizes when the firm
should incorporate help into its PM system—andwhen
it might be preferable to rely on a no-help system.
Using this framework, we develop insights on the rel-
ative gains possible from a help system contingent not
only on strategic factors (project and recovery values)
but also on operational factors (effectiveness of efforts
and opportunity costs). Contrary to intuition, a help
system becomes more advisable as the project man-
agers’ opportunity cost increases. Also, since a help
system can transform loss-making projects into viable
ones, it can be more advantageous to projects of low
than of high value.
Second, we prescribe how to use a formalized help
process to managemultiple projects. The key lies in the
combination of creating interdependencies between
projects and designing help-based and time-based
incentives accordingly. In implementing the help sys-
tem, the firm should exploit the flexibility of pooling
resources from multiple projects toward a troubled
one, and reward project managers for time perfor-
mance and help exchange. A formal help processworks
by purposely creating interdependencies and then
exploiting these. It gives the firm options to prioritize
ex ante identical projects one over another, and back-
load resources in projects. As a consequence, encour-
aging help expands the portfolio of projects that can be
profitably undertaken with high levels of engagement.
This approach is in contrast with that in the no-help
system where project engagement and incentives are
purely based on the success of one’s own project.
Finally, we demonstrate, from a cost-benefit perspec-
tive, why firms should choose to optimally influence
help exchange. The costs of help are incurred because
the firm needs to pay both managers for help exchange
and meanwhile overcome free-riding concerns. The
benefits of help are generated by the following mech-
anisms. Cost efficiencies can arise when the effective-
ness of help is very high, which lowers the risk of fail-
ure and hence the incentives to both project managers
under help. Even if the cost burden were to increase,
the higher probability of success under help may yet
raise the expected value to the company if the cost is
not overly high. Finally, intertemporal incentive effects
lower the incentives in the first stage as the project
managers anticipate the possibility to provide help and
earn the rent to overcome free riding. Implementation
of the help system may not be optimal when the ben-
efits of help are small and unable to compensate for
the cost of free riding. Thus, the formal help system is
intended to channel the helping behavior rather than
encourage altruistic helping, after fully accounting for
all costs and benefits of helping.
Our findings echo recent research (Hutchison-
Krupat and Kavadias 2016) addressing optimal incen-
tives for cross-functional teams. We also show how
a firm can use help to optimize the timing of high
engagement in projects. In doing so, firms may bene-
fit from earlier project engagement and thereby reap
the well-known benefits of front-loading (Thomke and
Fujimoto 2000). We augment those results by showing
that back-loading of project engagement (i.e., delaying
project efforts) can also be optimal when a help process
is in place.
2. Related Literature
This paper speaks and contributes primarily to
the literature on incentives in project management.
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The practitioner-oriented bodies of PM knowledge
(Kerzner 2013, PMI 2013) emphasize the importance of
help across projects. However, this literature does not
offer any systematic advice on when, how, and why
to encourage such help. The innovation management
literature similarly indicates that cooperative behavior
across projects improves their performance (Sivadas
and Dwyer 2000, Hoegl et al. 2004) while offering no
theoretical analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of a
formal help process. To inform our inductively moti-
vated research problem, we can nevertheless (i) con-
ceptually draw from the organizational design litera-
ture on interdependencies and coordination between
subunits, and also (ii) methodologically build on the
principal-agent literature that addresses incentives for
cooperation.
2.1. Interdependencies Between Projects
When managing multiproject environments (e.g., in
R&D organizations), it is crucial to recognize that—
although completing any project contributes value to
the company—there are interdependencies between
projects and their managers (Adler et al. 1995, 1996).
These interdependencies entail that specific actions
taken in one project will affect the other project (Krish-
nan and Ulrich 2001). So that we can better charac-
terize these interdependencies, in this paper we adopt
a framework from the field of organizational design
(Puranamet al. 2012) that distinguishes betweenproject
interdependence and agent interdependence.1 Con-
sider the case of two projects, 1 and 2, that are assigned
(respectively) to project managers A and B.
Project interdependence exists when the value of exe-
cuting one project differs as a function of whether or
not the other project is also executed. Project inter-
dependence could arise from interdependent inputs,
as when joint dependence on a common input factor
offers economies of scale and pooling benefits or when
projects compete for resource allocation (Kavadias and
Loch 2003, Girotra et al. 2007). It could also arise from
interdependent outputs, as when knowledge is devel-
oped over time in domains that span several projects
(Chao and Kavadias 2008, Gaimon et al. 2011) or when
the projects aim to develop compatible solutions that
yield a consistent overall result (Mihm et al. 2003, Sosa
et al. 2004, Gokpinar et al. 2010).
Agent interdependence exists when the reward for
project manager A depends on project manager B’s
actions (and vice versa). Thus project agents are inter-
dependent when they face “broad” incentives linked
to the output of all agents’ units; they are independent
when they face “narrow” incentives linked only to their
own units’ outputs (Kretschmer and Puranam 2008).
Puranam et al. (2012) argue that task interdependence
is neither necessary nor sufficient for agent interdepen-
dence, so the two concepts are orthogonal and can be
decoupled.
Kretschmer and Puranam (2008) explore incentives
for collaboration between differentiated subunits with
interdependent production functions. These authors
find that the benefits of increased agent interdepen-
dence (via broad incentives for both subunits’ outputs)
do increase collaborative efforts but may come at the
cost of each subunit neglecting its own production
tasks. Hutchison-Krupat and Kavadias (2016) study
the optimal breadth of incentives for cross-functional
teams under different value-generating project inter-
dependencies. They find that functional interdepen-
dencies can act as substitutes for agent interdependen-
cies; in other words, the breadth of incentives becomes
less important as functional interactions become more
important for value creation.
From a conceptual standpoint, the helping mech-
anism we introduce creates agent interdependence via
broad incentives that account for helping. Thus the
reward for project manager A depends in part on
the actions of help provided by project manager B.
In the absence of help, projects are assumed to be inde-
pendent. Yet if help is provided then, because agents
also represent the (key) input factor required to execute
projects that are made available across tasks, project
interdependence is also created. To see this, consider the
value of executing project 1. Under a system with help,
the value contributed by project 1 depends also on
whether and when project 2 is executed; the reason is
that early execution of project 2 can free up input fac-
tor capacity (in the form of help from manager B) for
project 1. Our study first contributes to the research
on project and agent interdependencies by adding the
time dimension of project execution: the company reor-
ganizes project work dynamically by means of a help
process. Second, our study complements this research
by demonstrating how the firm chooses an optimal
level of agent interdependence (ranging from a narrow
agent focus to broader, help-based incentives) and also
an optimal level of project interdependence (no, unilat-
eral, or mutual help exchange between projects). It is
worth noting howour results reveal that “shirking” can
be beneficial in certain situations (Hutchison-Krupat
and Kavadias 2016)—here, as a result of asymmetric
engagement deliberately induced by the firm. How-
ever, since help in our system is exchanged dynami-
cally (red-card help is contingent on the helping agent’s
own project being on schedule), it follows that help
never has priority over own-project work.
2.2. Cooperation and Moral Hazard in Projects
Principal-agent models are naturally relevant to PM
settings in which project managers are better informed
than is the company about (a) their uncertain tasks
and (b) the costly efforts they exert (Mihm 2010). The
result is a moral hazard problem between agents and
the principal, who cannot observe agent effort lev-
els. Hence the principal seeks to design contracts that
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incentivize each agent to exert the desired effort level
(Laffont and Martimort 2001). In the context of mul-
tiple agents, Itoh (1991) introduces the possibility of
cooperation in a two-agent, two-taskmodel where each
agent decides on own-task effort levels and also on
effort levels for helping the other agent. Neither type
of effort is observable by the principal. The princi-
pal maximizes company profits by setting a compen-
sation scheme that induces either strict division of
labor or teamwork with mutual help; the latter out-
come is optimal when help and own-task effort are
complements. A similar situation is studied by Drago
and Turnbull (1991), who predict that companies will
implement noncompetitive promotion schemes when
help is efficient and there is imperfect information
regarding worker effort. Building upon Itoh’s model,
Siemsen et al. (2007) derive optimal individual and
group incentives in the presence of different linkages
pertaining to outcome, help, and knowledge. When
help linkages exist—that is, when agents can effectively
provide help—optimal group-level incentives should
be positive. In contrast with Kretschmer and Puranam
(2008) andHutchison-Krupat and Kavadias (2016), this
literature suggests that group and individual incen-
tives must be carefully balanced in order to discourage
agents from shirking.
The moral hazard problem in our project environ-
ment bears similarities to the principal-agent mod-
els just cited. However, the time dimension—which
is key for value creation in our multiproject setting—
has been neglected by classical principal-agent models
with cooperation (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1990, Itoh
1992). Rather than relying on help, for instance, project
managers may simply choose to spend more effort in a
later period (Zhang 2016, Rahmani et al. 2017). Crucial
to the problem we study is that an agent can help a
colleague only if her own project is on schedule, so that
she has “freed up time” to provide help. Moreover, the
provision of help is visible to topmanagement; this vis-
ibility allows the company to facilitate the help process
by tailoring new incentives in addition to those already
in place.
In project environments where completion time
plays a leading role, Bayiz and Corbett (2005) and
Kwon et al. (2010) study payment schemes for mul-
tiproject subcontractors who work on complemen-
tary tasks. Wu et al. (2014) incorporate present-biased
agents who exhibit a behavioral tendency to postpone
work for later completion. In such environments, mile-
stones and deadlines are crucial determinants of indi-
vidual (Zhang 2016) or coproduction efforts (Rahmani
et al. 2017). These models highlight the intricate inter-
play of payment and effort timing. However, none of
the cited papers accounts for help across projects.
In multiproject settings under uncertainty and cen-
tralized decision making, the flexible rearrangement of
project work has been shown to reduce the completion
times of projects. Adler et al. (1995, 1996) show how
multiple cross-trained engineers working on the same
task can reduce average project completion times. For
environments characterized by task-time uncertainty,
Goh and Hall (2013) advocate risk pooling via flexible
commitment of resources (e.g., personnel, equipment,
budget) to individual project tasks. However, this liter-
ature has ignored how help across projects can unlock
the benefits of risk pooling—let alone when and how it
should be encouraged. In this paper we do character-
ize when and how resource flexibility can be profitably
created, by means of a help process, in decentralized
project environments.
3. Model and Analysis
3.1. Model Grounding
Our model is grounded in the three most salient com-
ponents of Roto’s PM system: its project portfolio plan-
ning, (2) the implemented help process, and (3) per-
formance measurement and rewards. Table 1 lists the
detailed components of Roto’s formal help system and
our translation into a formal model.
First, the model should represent Roto’s annual
project portfolio planning cycle. Under this cycle,
projects are defined and released for common deliv-
ery dates with exogenously given deadlines—most of
which are imposed by annually recurring trade-fair
presentation dates. When not busy with their main
project(s), employees are supposed to work on sec-
ondary projects or nonproject work.
Second, the help process should be modeled closely
after Roto’s practice. Here, the help request is visu-
alized by help seekers literally affixing a red card on
top of their desk. This action makes the help request
observable to all project employees and to top man-
agement. Crucial to the help process is that a request
triggers help, which means that the help-seeking and
help-providing project managers will try to solve the
problem by teamwork—rather thanmerely reassigning
project work to another project manager. Roto instructs
its project managers to request help during project exe-
cution when their project is at risk to miss the project
deadline. A raised red card triggers the head of new
product development as well as the project coordina-
tor to approach the help-seeking project manager or
engineer about assembling a red-card team. Help can
be requested by project managers (typically for help
across projects) or by project engineers (typically for
help within the project across tasks). In line with our
focus on the strategic and tactical features of a help sys-
tem and its interaction with project portfolio planning,
we model cross-project help triggered by the project
managers. Roto chooses potential helpers who are both
available (i.e., at no risk of delaying their own project)
and have the technical competence to help (i.e., they
Crama, Sting, and Wu: Encouraging Help Across Projects
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Table 1. Translating Roto’s Project Management System of Formal Help Into a Model
System component Roto’s formal help system Model of a formal help system Modeling rationale
Project portfolio
planning
Planning cycle with common project releases
and deadlines.
Idem Equivalence
Project deadlines that are exogenous (annual
trade fair).
Idem Equivalence
Project portfolio fixed during planning cycle
with about 20 main projects of similar
scope.
Portfolio is fixed during planning
cycle with two equivalent
projects.
Minimal representation
Residual time used for secondary projects
and nonproject backup work.
Residual time is used for
secondary nonproject work.
Focus on project vs.
nonproject work
Help process Help request is formal and observable to all;
visualized by a red card.
Idem Equivalence
Cooperation of help-seeking and
help-providing employees on red-card
teams.
Idem Equivalence
When? If troubled task jeopardizes a project
deadline.
If project is unfinished at
scheduled completion time.
Minimal representation
Response: Top management assigns helping
employees from different projects or from
different tasks of the same project.
Top management induces the
other project manager to help.
Focus on tactical
cross-project help
Who requests? Project managers and project
engineers.
Project managers request help. Focus on tactical
cross-project help
Who helps? Available project employees (i.e.,
own project is not endangered) with
complementary technical capability.
The other project manager if her
project is completed.
Focus on availability
with variable
complementarity
Performance
measurement
and rewards
Individual time-based KPIs for timely project
delivery, both for project and task
deadlines.
Individual financial rewards for
timely project delivery.
Generalized
representation of
explicit objectives
Individual help-based KPIs for help seeking
and help provision recorded in red-card
database.
Individual financial rewards for
timely project delivery with
help.
Generalized
representation of
explicit objectives
have complementary capabilities for tackling the trou-
bled project).
Third, our model must incorporate the system com-
ponents of performance measurement and rewards.
We remark that the help system in steady state is
inherently formal in that it relies on explicit measure-
ments (although they are not directly related to finan-
cial rewards). For instance, Roto’s system involves no
direct financial reward for on-schedule project comple-
tion yet projectmanagers are explicitly evaluated based
on completion-time key performance indicators (KPIs).
And even though there is no direct financial reward
linked to helping, Roto’s top management keeps track
of all help transactions via its red-card database. These
data, too, are used as explicit help-based KPIs; for
example, the company evaluates how successful is the
help provided by each project manager. In sum, Roto’s
project management system encourages early project
completion and formal help exchange by relying on
explicit measures that are contractible. The model cap-
tures thesemeasures in the form of financial rewards so
that Roto’s system can be easily adapted to project envi-
ronments in which financial rewards can be directly
linked to KPIs.
3.2. Model of a Formal Help System
For a minimal representation of a project environment
with help, we consider a company that assigns two
symmetric projects to two equally capable project man-
agers. The project’s payoff for the firm depends on its
completion time. A project completed on schedule (in
t  0) yields the company a total payoff ofV ; an initially
troubled yet recovered project with delayed comple-
tion (in t  1) yields the company αV ; and the payoff
for an unfinished and therefore abandoned project is
normalized to 0. The parameter α ∈ (0, 1] denotes a
project’s recovery value that the firm can recoup under
delayed completion. It is intuitive that the company
will benefit from faster (ideally, on-schedule) delivery
of its projects. Within a given time period, a project
manager who is not induced to work on a project is
tasked with secondary, nonproject work that yields a
constant revenue o to the firm. So for the firm, o rep-
resents the opportunity cost of the project managers’
capacity.
The firm’s objective is to maximize its expected prof-
it—namely, the expected payoff from the two projects
(net of their costs) and from secondary work. Because
the projects are delegated to two autonomous project
managers, the company seeks to design incentives
Crama, Sting, and Wu: Encouraging Help Across Projects
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Figure 1. Sequence of Events in a No-Help System and with an Additional Formal Help Process
Firm sets time-
based incentives
w0, w1
Firm sets time-
and help-based
incentives
w0, w1, wh, wr
Project
manager i
chooses effort
ei, 0
Troubled
manager i asks
for help
if available
Project
outcomes
observed and
payoffs received
Troubled manager i
chooses effort ei, 1
Help available: effort
choices i, j
Help unavailable:
effort choices ei, 1, ej, 1
t = –1 t = 0 t = 1
Scheduled
finish
Formal
help
system
No help
system
Project
outcomes
observed and
payoffs received
Project
manager i
chooses effort
ei, 0
Project
outcomes
observed and
payoffs received
Project
outcomes
observed and
payoffs received
that induce actions capable of realizing that objective.
Figure 1 presents the sequence of events in the stan-
dard project management (no-help) system and in the
red-card (formal help) system.
In the base case of a no-help system, the firm first
chooses a set of time-based incentives in t −1—that is,
payments to a project manager based on completion
time, which is verified when the project is finished.
The firm pays project manager i (i  1, 2) either wi , 0 or
wi , 1 according to whether the project is completed on
schedule (by the end of t  0) or behind schedule (by
the end of t  1). In t  0, project manager i chooses
whether to exert effort (ei , 0  1) or not (ei , 0  0).2 This
engagement comes at a cost of cei , 0 (c > 0), though
the actual value ei , 0 is not observable to the company.
The project can be completed on schedule (i.e., by the
end of t  0) with success probability p ∈ (0, 1) if the
project manager exerts effort, but it cannot be finished
on schedule if the project manager chooses to exert no
effort. Whether because of uncertainty or no previous
effort, a project manager may find himself unable to
deliver by the end of t  0. Then, in t  1, he can again
choose a level of effort ei , 1 ∈ {0, 1}while facing the same
success probabilities p and cost c encountered in t  0.
Once again, owing to uncertainty or lack of effort, a
troubled project may not recover and so may not be
completed by the end of t  1. In that case, the project
will be abandoned and thus will not generate value for
the company.
As an add-on to standard project management, the
company can implement the red-card help process
described in Section 3.1. Then the firm chooses and
commits to an additional set of help-based incentives
in t  −1 to encourage efforts in the help scenario:
it offers w j, h to the helping manager j ( j  1, 2 with
j , i) and offers wi , r to the help-receiving manager i.
These help-based incentives are paid only if a troubled
project is recovered with help and finishes in t  1.
For a recovered project the firm pays no time-based
incentives. Note, however, that project manager j will
have earned w j, 0 for finishing her project on sched-
ule and can earn w j, h if successfully helping a col-
league to recover his project. Thus the help system’s
compensation package for project manager i is wi {wi , 0 ,wi , 1 ,wi , h ,wi , r}. (Since project managers are sym-
metric, we suppress the i and j subscripts when there
is no difference in their respective incentives.) Upon
learning about project outcomes by the end of t  0, the
manager of a troubled project (manager i) can raise a
red card to seek help from project manager j in t  1—
provided that j’s project is completed on schedule. A
raised red card is visible to senior management, which
ensures that a helping manager will be assigned if one
is available.
The probability of recovering a focal project that is
behind schedule in t  1 depends on the effort choices
of both the helped (ηi ∈ {0, 1}) and the helping (η j ∈{0, 1}) project managers, but neither choice is observ-
able to the firm; as described in Section 3.1, the project
managers cooperate without top management interfer-
ence. If neither project manager exerts effort during
their red-card teamwork, the project cannot be recov-
ered. If either one of the project managers exerts effort
(thus incurring cost c), then the project is recovered
with probability p. These values are equivalent to the
probability and cost under the no-help system. If both
project managers exert efforts under help (ηi  η j  1)
and each incurs cost c for doing so, then the probability
of recovering the troubled project is p + hp(1− p). Here
h ∈ [0, 1/p] signifies the complementarity of help when
project managers work jointly to recover the project
(cf. Siemsen et al. 2007).3 As help complementarity
exceeds a threshold—that is, when h > 1—the two
cooperating project managers together have a greater
likelihood of success than one project manager exert-
ing effort twice (i.e., in sequence). The opposite out-
come obtains under low complementarity of help. We
assume that a troubled project’s chance of being recov-
ered and completed in t  1 is memoryless—that is, it
depends on the efforts expended in t  1 but not on
efforts expended in t  0.4
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In sum, our PM model of formal help relies on
a minimal set of assumptions that allow us to bal-
ance parsimony with grounding in the Roto case.
We have translated Roto’s project portfolio planning,
its help process, and its performance measurement
and rewards into corresponding formal components
(see Table 1). Beyond the Roto-specific components,
we have incorporated features common to many new
product development settings: effort is costly to exert
but is not observable; the effect of effort on project com-
pletion is uncertain and memoryless; and the firm’s
value from project completion decays over time.
We shall analyze and compare the system of no help
(in Section 3.3) with that of help (in Section 4). As is
the case for Roto, we assume that the company credi-
bly commits to the help system; thus the firm sustains
help-based incentives, initially fixed in t −1, through-
out all periods of a project.
3.3. Base Model: Project Management in a
No-Help System
We start by analyzing the no-help system in which
the two projects are executed independently and with-
out help. Toward that end, we work backward through
the project managers’ objectives and effort decisions.
Recall that the compensation package for manager i
specifies a reward for completion on schedule or
behind schedulew {w0 ,w1}. Project manager i’s pay-
off in t  1 can be written as pii , 1(ei , 1)  w1pei , 1 − cei , 1.
If the firm wants project manager i to exert effort in
t  1, then the offered incentive w1 should satisfy the
following condition:
pii , 1(ei , 1  1) ≥ pii , 1(ei , 1  0) ⇐⇒ pw1 − c ≥ 0.
Figure 2. Optimal Firm Choices and Effort Levels in a No-Help System
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Thus the optimal incentive for effort in t  1 is
w∗1  c/p. To induce effort for on-schedule project com-
pletion (in t  0), the firm must consider the overall
payoff a project manager expects to receive. That payoff
can be expressed as follows:
pii , 0(ei , 0 , ei , 1) pw0ei , 0 − cei , 0 + (1− p)(pw1ei , 1 − cei , 1).
The incentive wage w0 must satisfy pii , 0(ei , 0  1, ei , 1) ≥
pii , 0(ei , 0  0, ei , 1)⇔ pw0 ≥ c, so the optimal incentive to
induce effort in t  0 is w∗0  c/p.
The firm chooses the combination of project efforts
or secondary work (in the two consecutive periods)
that maximizes its expected profit Π. Proposition 1
summarizes the incentives and induced efforts that are
optimal from the firm’s perspective.
Proposition 1. As a function of (α,V), the following firm
choices are optimal in a no-help system.
(i) The firm induces effort throughout all periods by set-
ting w∗0  w∗1  c/p when pαV ≥ c + o , in which case it
earns a profit of Π 2(p(V + o) − c + (1− p)(pαV − c)).
(ii) The firm induces only early effort by setting w∗0  c/p
and w∗1  0 when pαV < c+ o ≤ pV, thereby earning a profit
of Π 2(pV − c)+ 2o.
(iii) The firm precludes effort by settingw∗0w∗10when
pV < c + o; in this case, the firm earns a profit from only the
secondary work (Π 4o) and abandons the projects.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal firm choices in a no-
help system contingent on the project recovery value α
(x-axis) and the project payoff V (y-axis) for a lower
success probability (left-hand panel, p  0.2) and a
greater success probability (right-hand panel, p  0.4).5
The firm always induces effort (e0  e1  1) in the black
region of the graphs. It is intuitive that, if the firm can
generate high payoffs from on-schedule completion or
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from behind-schedule completion, then it is optimal to
induce effort in all project periods. In each graphs gray
region, the firm optimally induces only early efforts
(e0  1, e1  0) because the lower recovery value α
no longer warrants inducing costly project recovery
efforts. In the graphs’ white regions, the firm abandons
projects at the outset. Here the low payoff V is not
expected to cover the firm’s cost of inducing the early
efforts required to deliver a project, so the firm collects
only the payoff from secondary work.
Therefore, and in line with the front-loading argu-
ment of Thomke and Fujimoto (2000), it is never opti-
mal in a no-help system for the firm to induce only
late effort (i.e., to incentivize e0  0, e1  1). The reason
is that, in our model, the payoff from project comple-
tion decays over time, whereas the project managers’
effort costs (and the corresponding success probabili-
ties) persist.
4. Project Management with Help
In this section we study the optimal design of incen-
tives in a PM system with help; the company commits
to its choice of help system and sustains incentives
throughout stages. Working backward, in Section 4.1
we first analyze how the firm sets help-based incen-
tives to encourage help for a troubled project in period
t  1 (stage 2). Note that if both managers are troubled
in t  1, then help is not available and so efforts will
be induced by the time-based incentive w1 (as in Sec-
tion 3). Thus we focus on the help game in t  1 when
one project manager (i) is troubled and the other man-
ager ( j) is available for help. Then, in Section 4.2, we
analyze how the firm optimizes time-based incentives
for early effort in t  0 (stage 1), which will enable us to
determine optimality conditions for the different PM
system configurations (Section 4.3). We conclude in
Section 4.4 with a discussion on the value-creating and
value-reducing mechanisms of the help system.
4.1. Second Stage: How the Company
Encourages Help
Both the helped and helping managers can choose
whether or not to exert effort; hence there are four pos-
sible equilibria depending on the incentive structure.
Consider an equilibrium in which one of the project
managers exerts no effort (ηi  0, η j  1 or ηi  1, η j  0).
In either one of these equilibria, the chance of project
recovery is no greater than what the troubled manager
could achieve on his own. As a consequence, those par-
tial help equilibria do not improve company profits and
so are dominated from the firm’s perspective. Yet if the
firm can induce effort from both projectmanagers, then
its profit may increase because the likelihood of com-
pletion increases. The rate of increase is determined by
the help complementarity h between the helping and
the troubledmanager. In themodel presented here, the
value of h is known to the project managers and also to
the firm. (In Section 5.1 we relax that assumption and
show that our qualitative results still hold when h is
private information learned by the project managers.)
We can therefore analyze help-based incentives by
concentrating on the equilibrium in which effort is
exerted by both the helping and the troubled manager.
In this case, the firm should set incentives that satisfy
the following three constraints:
wrp(1+ h(1− p)) − c ≥max{w1p − c , 0};
wrp(1+ h(1− p)) − c ≥ wrp;
whp(1+ h(1− p)) − c ≥ whp.
The first two constraints ensure (respectively) that the
troubledmanager calls for help and that he exerts effort
while being helped. The third constraint ensures that
the helping manager actually exerts effort during the
help process. The incentives that optimize company
profits for this equilibrium are given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The optimal incentives for help in t  1 are
w∗r  w
∗
h 
c
p(1− p)h .
This lemma states that the optimal incentives are
the same for the troubled and the helping manager.
That outcome follows because, for each manager, the
binding constraint is the incentive compatibility con-
straint for each manager to exert effort under help.
Observe that both of the optimal help-based incen-
tives are decreasing in the complementarity parame-
ter h. As complementarity h increases, lesser incen-
tives are needed to encourage the project managers’
efforts. Thus the company may benefit not only from
higher expected payoffs (because of the increased like-
lihood of project recovery) but also from cost reduc-
tions (because of lower incentives).
4.2. First Stage: How the Company Encourages
Early Efforts
The incentive w0 for on-time completion is the only
remaining item in the firm’s incentive package. The
project managers’ early efforts are a pivotal aspect of
the help system’s configuration, because only those
project managers who exert early effort in t  0 are able
to complete their respective projects by the end of t  0
and thus be in a position to help a troubled colleague
in t  1. The company can set w0 to induce one of the
following three scenarios: the high engagement scenario
(indexed by superscript H ), where both project man-
agers exert effort for on-schedule completion; the asym-
metric engagement scenario (superscript A), where one
manager exerts effort while the other does not; and the
no engagement scenario, where neither manager exerts
early effort.
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A project manager’s expected payoff at the start of
a project consists of revenues from completion on or
behind schedule, with or without help, and as either
a receiver or a giver of help. Project managers choose
effort levels thatmaximize their respective utilities over
the two time periods. Our next proposition character-
izes the optimal incentives for on-schedule completion
with help.
Proposition 2. If the company chooses to encourage help in
t  1, then the following statements hold.
(i) To induce the scenario with high engagement (ei , 0 
e j, 0  1), the firm’s optimal incentive for on-time comple-
tion is wH0 max{0, c/p − c/h + pc/((1− p)h)}.
(ii) To induce the scenario with asymmetric engagement
(ei , 0+ e j, 0  1), the firm’s optimal on-time completion incen-
tive for one project manager is zero and for the other manager
is wA0 max{0, c/p − c/((1− p)h)}.
Comparing the incentives in the two cases of Propo-
sition 2, we observe that high engagement costs the
firm more than asymmetric engagement: the compen-
sation offered to eachmanager in the high-engagement
scenario is higher than the compensation offered to
the high-effort manager in the asymmetric scenario
(i.e., wH0 ≥ wA0 ). In the asymmetric scenario, the high-
effort project manager’s expectation of earning a future
help-based incentive wh allows the company to reduce
the incentive to a level that is below that needed to
induce high engagement. In the high-engagement sce-
nario, managers’ expectations of a future help-based
incentive wh are lower because each project manager
exerts effort and so opportunities to earn that incen-
tive are less likely to arise. This expectation of a future
profit from help allows the company to set the incen-
tive for asymmetric engagement lower than that in the
no-help system (i.e., wA0 < w∗0  c/p). However, it is
interesting that the same is not generally true for the
high-engagement incentive: when p > 0.5, we find that
wH0 > w
∗
0. If the probability of on-schedule completion
is high, then the project managers are reluctant to exert
effort simultaneously because in that case neither one
is likely to gain from providing help. So to prevent
projectmanagers from shirking in t 0, the firm should
incentivize them with a higher reward—one that leads
to surplus utility when the project is completed on
schedule.
4.3. Optimal Project Management Configurations
The company chooses its PM configuration so as to
generate the maximum profit by selecting time-based
and help-based incentives that optimally induce or dis-
courage individual and cooperative efforts. The follow-
ing proposition characterizes the firm’s optimal equi-
librium choice as a function of project parameters.
Proposition 3. Whenever h(1 − p) ≥ p(2 − p), the com-
pany’s optimal engagement strategies can be characterized as
follows.
1. When pαV < c + o , the company induces no effort in
t  1 from the troubled manager when help is not available.
Furthermore, the company chooses
(a) high engagement by offering both managers a com-
mon payment wH0 if V ≥max{V1 ,V2}; or
(b) asymmetric engagement by offering one manager
wA0 and the other manager zero if min{V2 ,V3} >V ≥ V4.
2. When pαV ≥ c+ o, the company induces effort in t  1
from the troubled manager when help is not available. Fur-
thermore, the company chooses
(a) high engagement in both periods by offering both
managers a common payment wH0 if V ≥max{V5 ,V6}; or
(b) asymmetric engagement by offering one manager
wA0 and the other manager zero if min{V3 ,V5} >V .
In all cases not specified here, the company chooses not to
induce help and sets the optimal time-based incentives for
the no-help system as given in Proposition 1.
The first striking result from Proposition 3 is that
both the help system and the no-help system can be
optimal. Moreover, unlike in the no-help system—
which, as stated in Proposition 1, chooses identical
engagement levels for symmetric projects—the formal
help system may induce different engagement lev-
els across otherwise identical projects. As a result,
adding a help process to a standard PM system gives
rise to more varied engagement strategies in the first
stage. The left- and right-hand panels of Figure 3
illustrate these optimal strategies for (respectively)
low and high probabilities of success. We remark
that Figure 3 also enables identification of areas ripe
for increased engagement (as compared with the no-
help system) because it is parameterized identically to
Figure 2.
We begin by looking at what remains the same as
in the no-help system—namely, the areas shaded in
black or gray, where the no-help system dominates.
Although the help system is generally optimal when
the project payoff and recovery value are both high,
there are significant differences between the cases of
high versus lowprobabilities of success.When compar-
ing the left and the right panels of Figure 3, one can see
that the no-help system becomes more advantageous
as the probability of project success increases. In such
cases, the firm prefers to rely on time-based incentives
without help exchange, even for larger recovery values.
The firm thereby precludes free riding, whose costs are
a downside of the help system that we shall further
elucidate in Section 4.4.When the probability of project
success is high, inducing help is suboptimal unless the
project payoff and recovery value are both extremely
high—or pαV ≥ c + o. Then the formal help process is
simply a means by which the company can intensify
its push to recover projects that are of such high value
that any inefficiencies because of free riding can be jus-
tified. In contrast, if the probability of project success
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Figure 3. Optimal PM System Configurations Under High Complementarity of Help (h  1/p)
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is low then a help process is optimal (a) whenever the
firm would induce effort under the no-help system and
(b) for payoff and recovery values that would not war-
rant a recovery effort under the no-help system. Thus
we see that a formal help process (provided it is feasi-
ble) allows the firm not only to increase the intensity
of its project recovery efforts but also to recover trou-
bled projects that, under the no-help system, would be
abandoned in t  1.
If success probabilities are low, then, provided com-
plementarity h is high enough, we can see that the
help systemmay facilitate portfolio expansion and project
prioritization; in fact, it may even lead to project back-
loading. These results are shown in the left panel
of Figure 3. First, we observe portfolio expansion—
whereby the firm profitably undertakes one or both
projects that the no-help system would reject—in the
left-hand panel of Figure 3 when V < (c + o)/p. Port-
folio expansion is enabled by the reduction in the
firm’s first-period incentives because of the possibility
of subsequent benefits from help, as detailed in Propo-
sition 2. Second, when portfolio expansion exists and
the project payoff reduces further, a help system with
asymmetric engagement becomes optimal. This find-
ing is noteworthy because, despite the two projects’
initial symmetry, the firm endogenously prioritizes one
of them. Since only one project manager exerts initial
effort, it follows that the transfer of help is unidirec-
tional: from the effort project to the no-effort project.
Thus prioritization assures the successful project man-
ager the opportunity to help and gain value, which
allows to further reduce the incentive to induce high
engagement from that projectmanager. The conditions
under which project portfolio expansion is a signifi-
cant implication of the help system are established by
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Project portfolio expansion and back-loading
exist if and only if h(1− p) > 12 (1+
√(5c + o)/(c + o)).
Finally, Lemma 2 also establishes the conditions for
back-loading—that is, for the firm delaying efforts as
compared with the case under no help—to be another
important consequence of the help system. It is remark-
able that, under these conditions, because of prioritiza-
tion we observe that a no-help system encourages high
initial effort for both projects, whereas a help system
induces late efforts on one of the projects. This unex-
pected result is driven by the project interdependency
created by the help system; when considering a project
portfolio that features help linkages among projects, it
can be more efficient initially to incentivize engage-
ment for just one project—thus reaping the cost bene-
fits of prioritization—and later to rely on the helping
process to recover the other project.
Figure 4 illustrates the company’s optimal PM sys-
tem configurations for lower levels of complementar-
ity (namely, h  0.75/p). Less help complementarity
reduces the areas in which the help system is opti-
mal when compared with the high-complementarity
case shown in Figure 3. The condition h(1− p) ≥ 12 (1+√(5c + o)/(c + o)) in Proposition 3 implies that if the
complementarity of help h < 1 then portfolio expan-
sion will not occur, but the help system may still be
beneficial nonetheless. Such benefits arise in settings
characterized by high project payoff V , a high recov-
ery parameter α, and a relatively low probability of
success. So despite offering no efficiency advantages—
when h < 1, two cooperating managers are actually
less likely to succeed than is a single manager exerting
effort in consecutive periods—help contributes value.
To summarize, we observe asymmetric engagement,
project portfolio expansion, and project back-loading
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Figure 4. Optimal PM System Configurations Under Low Complementarity of Help (h  0.75/p)
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as significant and robust effects of the help sys-
tem. These effects—and, more generally, the situa-
tional advantages of the help system over the no-help
system—result from several connected mechanisms.
Next, we shed more light on these mechanisms and
how they operate.
4.4. Mechanisms: How Help Creates or
Reduces Value
In this section we disentangle the mechanisms of the
help system while explaining how they operate to add
to or subtract from firm value.
Value-Creating Mechanisms. We start by illuminating
the mechanisms by which the help system creates
value. The contingencies of the project environment
that favor a help system are relatively straightforward:
project portfolios with high complementarity, low suc-
cess probability, and jointly high recovery and pay-
off values are more likely to benefit from introduc-
ing a help system. There are three separate yet nested
mechanisms through which a help system benefits the
firm in decreasing order: cost efficiency, higher suc-
cess probability, and intertemporal incentive effects.
These mechanisms are nested in the sense that, when
the help system engenders cost efficiency benefits, the
benefits from higher success probability and intertem-
poral incentive effects are also observed; in addition,
when there are no cost efficiency benefits but help
still increases the likelihood of success, intertemporal
incentive effects are also present. Finally, intertemporal
incentive benefits can also occur on their own without
the two other effects. For all values of success prob-
ability p and help complementarity h under which a
help system is the company’s optimal strategy, Fig-
ure 5 shows the highest-order mechanism attained (the
other parameter values are V  6, α  0.9, and o  0.25).
For extremely high complementarity and low success
probability, the total reward paid out for help falls short
of the reward for working alone (formally, wh + wr
≤ w1). Since help also reduces the reward paid out
in the first stage, these conditions make help strictly
advantageous in both the first and the second stage.
Thus help creates value by improving the firm’s cost
efficiency.
For slightly lower levels of complementarity, the total
reward for help exceeds the reward for working alone
(wh+wr >w1) and so the company’s profit—contingent
on success—is lower under help than under no help.
Yet help remains attractive because the firm expects
that the greater success probability enabled by bundled
efforts will compensate for the lower profit when suc-
cessful. Hence we still observe a net expected benefit of
help in the second stage, in addition to a cost reduction
in the first stage, and again the help system still proves
beneficial.
Figure 5. Value-Creating Mechanisms of Help
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Finally, for even lower complementarity and low
probability of success, there exists a region in which
the help system is actually detrimental in the second
stage; in other words, the increased probability of suc-
cess does not compensate for the higher cost of help.
However, project managers expect a positive payoff in
t  1 in the case of help, from which it follows that the
firm can reduce the time-based incentive w0 offered for
on-time completion. As a result, the help system can
increase company profit in t  0 even if it does not do
so in the second stage. Thus the intertemporal effect of
help leads to a reduced first-stage reward, and the net
impact of help on company profit becomes positive.
Value-Reducing Mechanism: Free Riding. Motivated
by the grounding case of Roto, our model assumes that
help requests are triggered in a decentralized way by
project managers; hence there is the potential for free
riding. To isolate the cost of the free-riding inherent
to a decentralized help process, we now compare the
basemodel with a centralized system inwhich the firm
controls help exchange as well as all efforts, individual
and under help. The optimal centralized PM system
configuration is illustrated in Figure 6, which is based
on parameter values identical to those for the decen-
tralized PM system shown in Figure 3. We observe that
help is even more attractive in the centralized than in
the decentralized system. This effect can therefore be
attributed to the elimination of the free-riding charac-
teristic of a decentralized help system. Free riding is
detrimental to a help system and is evidenced when a
help system is optimal under centralized but not under
decentralized decision making. This is especially true
of environments associated with greater probabilities
of success, as seen in the right panel of Figure 6.
Figure 6. Optimal Centralized PM System Configurations
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Interacting Mechanism: Secondary Work. Next we
focus on the effect that a secondary work opportu-
nity has on the value of help. Straightforward intu-
ition suggests that the more valuable the secondary
work, the less attractive the projects and the higher
the threshold that V must exceed for a project to be
undertaken. This is certainly the case when there is no
help, and analogous reasoning applies in the presence
of help: whenever help occurs in the second stage, at
least one of the projectmanagers is prevented fromper-
forming the secondary work; hence, secondary work
of greater value reduces the attractiveness of help. Yet
a more careful analysis reveals that, for intermediate
values of h with 1 < h(1 − p) < (1 + √5)/2, the port-
folio expansion effect of help occurs when the value
of the secondary work is sufficiently large—in other
words, the relative benefit of help may increase with
the value of secondary work. This dynamic is driven
mainly by the asymmetric engagement strategy, which
becomes relatively more attractive with increasing sec-
ondary work value. Indeed, with asymmetric engage-
ment, the idle manager engages in the (valuable) sec-
ondary work in the first stage; in the second stage,
either both project managers perform secondary work
(if the nonidle project manager failed) or the company
reaps the benefit of help (if the nonidle projectmanager
was successful). Therefore, the relative attractiveness
of projects in both systems decreases as the value of
secondarywork increases, but not at the same rate. Sec-
ondary work is less likely to detract from project work
in the presence of help than in the no-help system.
Bounds on the Value Created by Help. Finally, we pro-
vide bounds on the percentage increase in the com-
pany’s profit that the help system delivers above the
no-help system. In the absence of portfolio expansion,
we can show that the percentage profit increase from
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help is jointly increasing in the project payoff (V) and
the recovery value (α) and is bounded from above by
hp(1− p)2/(2− p), which does not exceed 50%.
In the presence of project portfolio expansion, how-
ever, the percentage profit increase over the no-help
system could become arbitrarily large if the value
of secondary work becomes arbitrarily small. In the
extreme case without secondary work (o  0), portfo-
lio expansion would represent an infinite percentage
increase in profit. Yet even in the case with project port-
folio expansion, if the value of secondary work is high
enough then the profit increase is similarly bounded
from above by hp(1 − p)2/(2 − p). The threshold value
of secondary work such that this bound holds is given
in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. The percentage profit increase from help is
bounded from above by hp(1−p)2/(2−p) ≤ 0.5 if and only if
o ≥max
{
c(h(1− p)(h(1− p) − 1) − 1)(2− p)
h(1− p)(2− p + h(1− p))(2− 3p) ,
c(h(1− p)2(h(1− p) − 1) − 1)(2− p)
h(1− p)2(2+ p(h(1− p) − 1))
}
.
5. Extensions
In this section we introduce several model extensions
that verify the robustness of our qualitative insights
on the benefits and costs of the PM system with for-
mal help. For this purpose, we augment the model by
accounting for private information on the value of help
complementarity and by increasing the set of possible
effort choices. The first extension allows us to deal with
the more realistic case in which project managers, but
not the firm, are able to assess the value of complemen-
tarity h. This situation is likely to occur because project
managers are typically better informed about project
problems and about the effectiveness of joint problem
solving under help. In that case, it may be inefficient for
the company to impose help for all troubled projects,
since the level of complementarity may be too low for
help to be of any benefit; hence it may be better for the
firm to offer screening incentives such that troubled
managers ask (and receive) help only when the com-
plementarity h is high. Our second extension allows for
a more fine-grained representation of effort choices—
in particular, by allowing the troubled project man-
ager to work harder on his own project. This approach
will enable us to determine whether help is benefi-
cial owing to the complementarity effect or rather to
an increased work rate. These extensions yield opti-
mal PM configurations that are more nuanced than
described previously, but we find that our main results
are robust to both of them.
5.1. Asymmetric Information on the
Complementarity of Help
We first analyze the game under help in t  0 when one
project manager is troubled and the other is available
for help. The exact value of help complementarity h
is observed by the project managers in t  0; however,
the firm knows only that this parameter can take either
a high value h  h¯ or a low value h 
¯
h (with equal
probability). Since the company does not know the true
value of h, it will likely refrain from triggering help in
a centralized fashion even though it can observe on-
schedule project completion. The reason is that help
may be suboptimal for the firm when
¯
h is low.
We therefore focus on two help policies, both of
which ensure that effort is exerted by each project
manager (ηi  1 and η j  1) and so have the poten-
tial to improve the company’s payoff: (i) a pooling pol-
icy, whereby the troubled project manager requests
help irrespective of whether complementarity is high
or low; and (ii) a shutdown policy, under which project
managers call for help only after establishing that com-
plementarity is high. In the shutdown policy, help for
a troubled project can be triggered only by the project
managers’ problem-specific decisions based on their
private information about the complementarity h. In
our setup, the firm commits not only to the help sys-
tem but also to a particular policy—that is, to a pooling
policy or a shutdown policy.
For the pooling policy, the firm must satisfy the in-
centive compatibility constraint of both project man-
agers as well as the individual rationality constraint
of the troubled project manager. These constraints
must hold for both high and low complementarity, but
clearly they can be binding only when complementar-
ity is low. For the shutdown policy, in contrast, the firm
must satisfy the same constraints but only when com-
plementarity is high. However, in this case the com-
pany faces an additional constraint: ensuring that a
troubled project manager will not request help when
complementarity is low.
The optimal incentives for both policies are stated in
our next result. Superscript P and S are used to index
(respectively) the pooling and shutdown policy.
Proposition 4. The optimal incentives for help in t  0 are
as follows.
(i) For the pooling policy, wPh  c/(p(1− p)¯h) and w
P
r 
c/(p(1− p)
¯
h).
(ii) For the shutdown policy, wSh  c/(p(1 − p)h¯) and
wSr  c/(p(1−p)h¯); this policy is feasible only when (h¯− ¯h) ·(1− p) ≥ 1.
Moreover, the optimal incentives for the pooling policy
are higher than those for the shutdown policy: (wPh ,wPr ) >(wSh ,wSr ).
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Figure 7. Optimal PM System Configurations with Asymmetric Information on Help Complementarity (h¯  1/p ,
¯
h  h¯ − 1.7,
o  0.25)
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Optimal Project Management System. Our findings
are illustrated by the graphs in Figure 7. We observe
that the main qualitative effects—namely, the expan-
sion of the portfolio and the prioritization of projects—
persist when information is asymmetric. The selected
problem parameters are such that we observe both
pooling- and shutdown-type help, but other parame-
ter choices could exclude the shutdown policy (e.g., if
(h¯ −
¯
h)(1− p) ≤ 1) or the pooling policy (e.g., if
¯
h  0).
We remark that the shutdown policy (if it can be
implemented) is preferable to the pooling policy for
lower payoffs and recovery values, whereas the pool-
ing policy requires a higher payoff and recovery value
to be optimal. Thus the company may often be unwill-
ing to induce help for all troubled projects; it may
instead prefer to set incentives that encourage help
requests contingent on the project managers’ observ-
ing a high level of complementarity h. This result is
intuitive given that (a) the reward under the pooling
policy is larger to induce project managers with low
complementarity to request help and (b) the benefits
of help may turn out to be low when complementarity
is low.
5.2. Model with Three Levels of Effort
So far the exertion of effort has been characterized as a
binary (effort–no effort) variable, yet in reality it could
take several values. Here we show that our key results
hold for a model in which the level of effort can take
one of three values—high (e  2), normal (e  1), or
none (e  0)—and briefly argue that they would con-
tinue to hold with increasing numbers of effort levels.
We assume that a project manager’s cost increases lin-
early with effort and that each unit increase in effort
corresponds to an additional draw from the same prob-
ability distribution for project completion. Suppose, for
example, that a project manager chooses high effort
(e  2); then her cost is 2c and her probability of com-
pleting the project by the end of the current period is
p(2− p).
5.2.1. No Help. In the no-help system, we observe the
intuitive result that higher effort levels are warranted
only for high payoffs and high recovery values. Since
cost increases linearly in effort whereas the likelihood
of success (project completion) is concave in effort, a
greater effort is justified only for high payoffs in the
first stage or for high payoffs and a high recovery value
in the second stage. These claims are illustrated in Fig-
ure 8 and are formalized in our next proposition.
Proposition 5. As a function of (α,V), the following firm
choices are optimal in a no-help system.
1. In the second stage, the firm induces high effort with
w∗1  c/(p(1− p)) when
αV ≥max
{
c
p(1− p)2 ,
c + (c + o)(1− p)
(2− p)(1− p)p
}
;
in the first stage, it induces high effort with w∗0 c(1+p2)/(p(1−p)) if
V ≥ max
{
c(1− 2p(1− p)2) − o(1− p)2p
p(1− p)2(1− αp(2− p)) ,
c(2− p(5− 2p(3− p)))+ o(1− p)3
p(1− p)(2− p)(1− αp(2− p))
}
,
induces normal effort with w∗0  c/p + pc/(1− p) if
c(1− 2p(1− p)2) − o(1− p)2p
p(1− p)2(1− αp(2− p)) ≥ V ≥
(c + o)(1− p) − cp
p(1− αp(2− p)) ,
and otherwise induces no effort.
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Figure 8. Optimal Firm Choices and Effort Levels in a No-Help System Under Three Effort Levels
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2. In the second stage, the firm induces normal effort with
w∗1  c/p when (c + o)/p ≤ αV ≤ c/(p(1− p)2); in the first
stage, it induces high effort w∗0  c/(p(1− p)) if
V ≥max
{
c(1− p(1− p)2) − o(1− p)2p
p(1− p)2(1− αp) ,
c(2− p)(1− p(1− p))+ o(1− p)3
p(1− p)(2− p)(1− αp)
}
,
induces normal effort with w∗0  c/p if
c(1− p(1− p)2) − o(1− p)2p
p(1− p)2(1− αp) ≥ V ≥
(c + o)(1− p)
p(1− αp) ,
and otherwise induces no effort.
3. In the second stage, the firm does not induce any effort if
αV ≤min
{
c + (c + o)(1− p)
p(1− p)(2− p) ,
c + o
p
}
;
in the first stage, it induces high effort with w∗0  c/(p(1− p)) if
V ≥max
{
c
p(1− p)2 ,
c + (c + o)(1− p)
p(1− p)(2− p)
}
,
induces normal effort with w∗0  c/p if c/(p(1− p)2) ≥ V ≥(c + o)/p , and otherwise induces no effort.
First, a comparison with the no-help base case
yields the interesting observation that there are project
parameter values for which the effort in the second
stage exceeds that of the first stage: e2  2 > e1  1.
This never occurred in the binary effort case, where a
project would receive effort in the second stage only if
it had also received effort in the first stage. In the multi-
ple effort model, however, the postponed high effort is
due to a negative intertemporal effect: when the com-
pany incentivizes a high effort in the second stage, the
project manager anticipates an expected profit in that
stage; and in the first stage, the project manager prefers
to work less in order to increase the probability of fail-
ure and then of reaping that expected second-stage
profit. For this reason, the firm must pay an additional
incentive to induce high or even normal effort in the
first stage.
It is instructive also to contrast this manifestation of
intertemporal influence with the positive intertempo-
ral effect of help discussed in Section 4.4. Help creates
a positive intertemporal effect because the expected
profit of helping cannot be reaped unless one’s own
project is completed. With multiple effort levels and
in the absence of help, however, we observe a nega-
tive intertemporal effect of help because the profit in
the second period can be obtained only if the project
manager fails his own project in the first stage.
Second, note that there exists an o¯ such that, when
o > o¯  cp(2 − p)/(1 − p)2, it is never optimal to exert
normal effort (ei , t  1) but exerting either no effort or
high effort is optimal. This situation arises because the
choice between normal or high effort in the project does
not depend on the value of secondary work: once the
project manager works on the project, regardless of her
effort level, she is assumed not to perform secondary
work. Nonetheless, the value of secondary work does
affect themanager’s decision about whether towork on
the project at all. To become profitable, project payoffs
need to surpass increasing thresholds as the value of
secondary work increases. Yet under such high project
payoffs, the company is better off inducing high effort
outright.
5.2.2. Help. Figure 9 illustrates that the key results per-
taining to the help system continue to hold also under
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Figure 9. Optimal PM System Configurations with Help Under Three Effort Levels
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the extension to more than two effort levels. We argue
further that a formal help process can lead to portfolio
expansion regardless of howmany effort levels are stip-
ulated. In other words, this result would persist even if
there were an infinite number of (countable) effort lev-
els. More specifically, since increasingly higher effort
levels will be optimal only at ever-increasing payoffs
and recovery values, it follows that the portion of the
graph where pV < c + o will not be affected by increas-
ing the number of effort levels. As a result, portfolio
expansion—and also the deliberate creation of asym-
metry in the project portfolio—will persist no matter
how many effort levels are allowed.
Introducing several effort levels has the additional
benefit of allowing us to focus on the different ways in
which help creates value at the project execution stage.
The first such advantage is created and also moderated
by the complementarity factor h. Help is valuable if the
problem encountered straddles the problem-solving
domains of both the troubled and helping project man-
ager. If the complementarity level h is low, then help
becomes correspondingly less attractive. Nevertheless,
help may still be beneficial when the project manager’s
work rate is constrained (as in the binary effort model,
where a project manager’s effort cannot exceed e  1
in one period). As mentioned previously, this dynamic
arises because help increases the work rate on a trou-
bled project. Yet that relation does not hold when the
same total capacity of effort levels can be achieved by
working alone as by working with help: in this event,
help (with ηi  η j  1) is valuable only if the comple-
mentarity h exceeds a certain threshold. Lemma 4 for-
mulates this claim; note that this threshold is strictly
greater than 1.
Lemma 4. The firm will prefer cooperation over high effort
if and only if
h ≥ 12 +
[√
8cpαV(1−p)2+(cp−pαV(1−p)2−o(1−p))2
+o(1−p)−cp] · [2pαV(1−p)2]−1.
Figure 9 also illustrates that a help process can lead
to either front- or back-loading. Back-loading occurs
when the gray-dotted area rises above the horizontal
line dividing the gray and black area; front-loading
occurs when the black-dotted area extends below that
same line. Front-loading occurs because the intertem-
poral incentive effect of help decreases the incentive
needed for engagement in the first period, thusmaking
higher engagement levels profitable for the firm.
6. Conclusion
Cooperative behavior is known to play a crucial role
in project environments, and innovation research has
identified cooperation across projects as a major deter-
minant of project success. State-of-the-art PM educa-
tion emphasizes the importance of a cooperative atmo-
sphere and advocates for leadership that establishes
such environments. Yet to the best of our knowledge,
no prior work has analyzed the effectiveness of using
a help process as a building block in a project envi-
ronment. The case of Roto, a manufacturer of roof
and solar technologies, demonstrates that a help pro-
cess can be effectively incorporated into a formal PM
system. Rather than relying on altruism or emotions
often associated with help, this formal process of help
sets incentives for rational help seeking and provi-
sion. Inspired by this company, we have built a model
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to shape a comprehensive answer to the question of
when, and if so, how and why a help process should
be used across projects. We derive our insights by com-
paring two relevant organizational alternatives: a PM
system with formal help and a standard PM system.
Our paper’s first contribution is to shed light on the
contingency factors that determine when a help system
should be used (or not). In fact, we find that both the
help system and the no-help system can be optimal.
A no-help system may be preferred when the benefits
of a help system do not offset its major drawback of free
riding.We also analyze the value that a help system can
create relative to a no-help system. Intuitively, a help
system is most valuable when payoff and recovery val-
ues are high, help is complementary, and project suc-
cess is more uncertain. Less intuitive, however, is that
the help system may become more advantageous as
project managers’ opportunity costs increase—because
then the firm can reap the expected benefits from both
types of work under asymmetric engagement.
Second, our paper contributes by characterizing how
the company should use a help system. The company
should create project interdependencies in combina-
tion with time- and help-based incentives. Regarding
these combinations we identify three subtle yet sig-
nificant effects. First, a surprising result is that the
help system can facilitate project prioritization; that is,
it may be optimal for the company to induce asym-
metric engagement (effort levels) for otherwise sym-
metric projects. In such an asymmetric engagement
configuration, help is provided in one direction: from
the high-engagement to the low-engagement project.
This result broadens the perspective obtained from
the single case of Roto; there, the system is operated
in accordance with our configuration of symmetric
engagement and bidirectional help. Second, the firm
can—often by relying on asymmetric engagement—
encourage help in such a way that its project port-
folio is profitably expanded; the implication is that
a company can deliver projects that would be aban-
doned under a no-help system. Third, the firm may
exemplify the accelerating effects on project timing
observed at Roto (Sting et al. 2015) and thus reap the
well-known benefits of front-loading projects (Thomke
and Fujimoto 2000). Yet we also identify other sit-
uations in which, contrary to extant PM knowledge
and to Roto’s situation, a help process should opti-
mally induce project back-loading. The benefit of back-
loading project efforts has not been discussed in the
literature because its value derives (as we demonstrate)
from help between projects that allow the firm to make
portfolio-wide timing adjustments, a phenomenon not
previously acknowledged.
Finally, we analyze why companies may benefit from
using a formal help process. Toward that end, we iden-
tify mechanisms that shape the costs and benefits of a
help system. We show that although help itself may be
expensive—compensation will be owed to two project
managers instead of just one, and free riding must be
overcome—help also creates an intertemporal incentive:
because project managers anticipate potential benefits
from offering help, the firm can reduce the incentives
it offers for timely completion. Furthermore, the greater
likelihood of success resulting from bundled efforts dur-
ing help may outweigh the higher cost for rewarding
such cooperation. Finally, when help is complementary
enough, thefirm incurs a lower cost for rewarding coop-
erative versus individual efforts and so benefits from
the efficiency gains of help. These findings contribute to
explaining Roto’s enhanced project completion perfor-
mance at lower execution costs (Sting et al. 2015).
We generalize the representation of effort tomultiple
effort levels and address the effect of private informa-
tion on the complementarity of help to show that our
main results remain robust. That said, our analysis is
subject to several limitations. The most telling of these
is that we analyze a two-project setting in which each
project can be completed at one of two possible com-
pletion times (or be abandoned), so we do not address
the effects of repeated interactions on the behavior of
those involved with the projects. Moreover, our analy-
sis focuses on managers at the project level; hence, the
model presented here does not incorporate individual
project tasks and their task owners. We must also men-
tion that our insights are limited to project interactions
within a single “strategic bucket” (Chao and Kavadias
2008, Hutchison-Krupat and Kavadias 2014), a model
assumption grounded in Roto’s rather homogeneous
project portfolio. In other words, the results we derive
ignore any effects that might arise because of differ-
ent project scopes, risks, or learning orientations across
such buckets. These important aspects of potential help
settings merit further investigation, and we hope that
future field or model-based work will extend our find-
ings along these promising avenues.
Acknowledgments
All authors contributed equally. The authors thank Depart-
ment Editor Serguei Netessine, the anonymous associate
editor, and reviewers. The authors also thank Shantanu
Bhattacharya, Steven Eppinger, Stephen Graves, Jeremy Hu-
tchison-Krupat, Nitin Joglekar, Stelios Kavadias, Christoph
Loch, Victor Martínez de Albéniz, Jürgen Mihm, Stephan
Scholtes, Svenja Sommer, and Niyazi Taneri; as well as par-
ticipants of the Singapore Management University summer
camp and seminars at Erasmus University Rotterdam, Frank-
furt School of Finance and Management, IE Business School,
IESEBusiness School, KatholiekeUniversiteit Leuven, Shang-
hai University of Finance and Economics, Supply Chain
Workshop at Sydney, Tsinghua University, TU Eindhoven,
TU Munich, University College London, University of Cam-
bridge, University of Cologne, WHU–Otto Beisheim School
of Management, and the INFORMS and MSOM annual
meetings.
Crama, Sting, and Wu: Encouraging Help Across Projects
18 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–22, ©2018 INFORMS
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Part (i) can be shown as follows. Project manager i exerts
effort in t  1 if w1p − c ≥ 0, so at this point we have w∗1  c/p.
He exerts effort in t  0 if w0p − c + (1 − p)(w0p − c) ≥ 0 and
so w∗0  c/p at this stage. The firm induces effort in t  1 if
Π  p(αV − w∗1) ≥ o, in which case pαV ≥ c + o. The firm’s
expected payoff from a project is thus
Π 2p(V −w∗0 + o)+ 2(1− p)p(αV −w∗1)
 2(p(V + o) − c + (1− p)(pαV − c)).
The rest of the proposition is proved similarly.
Proof of Lemma 1
Clearly, the optimal incentives are the minimum values that
satisfy the incentive constraints.
Proof of Proposition 2
In t  −1, the company can choose to incentivize either
high engagement (ei , 1  e j, 1  1) or asymmetric engagement
(ei , 1  0, e j, 1  1) for j  1, 2, j , i. Then project managers earn
the respective payoffs WH and WA. Formally,
WH  pwH0 − c + 2p(1− p)
(
p(1+ (1− p)h) c
p(1− p)h − c
)
,
WA(ei , 1  1) pwA0 − c + p
(
p(1+ (1− p)h) c
p(1− p)h − c
)
,
WA(ei , 1  0) p
(
p(1+ (1− p)h) c
p(1− p)h − c
)
.
To induce high engagement, the companymust ensure that
WH ≥WA(ei , 1  0), from which we obtain wHe ≥ c/p − c/h +
pc/((1− p)h). Therefore, the optimal wage is wH0 ≥max{c/p−
c/h + pc/((1− p)h), 0}. To induce high effort under asymmet-
ric engagement, the company must ensure that WA(ei , 1  1)
≥ 0; therefore, wAe ≥ c/p − c/((1 − p)h). Hence the optimal
wage is wA0 max{c/p − c/((1− p)h), 0}.
Proof of Proposition 3
The following equations express the firm’s payoff under the
optimal incentives for high engagement and help with and
without individual effort (respectively, HH and HL) when
help is unavailable as well as for asymmetric engagement
with andwithout individual effort (respectively,AH andAL)
when help is unavailable:
ΠHH  2p
(
V −max
{
c
p
− c
h
+
pc
(1− p)h , 0
})
+ 2p(1− p)p(1+ (1− p)h)
(
αV − 2c
p(1− p)h
)
+ 2(1− p)2(pαV − c)+ 2p2o;
ΠHL  2p
(
V −max
{
c
p
− c
h
+
pc
(1− p)h , 0
})
+ 2p(1− p)
· p(1+ (1− p)h)
(
αV − 2c
p(1− p)h
)
+ 2(1− p)2o + 2p2o;
ΠAH  p
(
V −max
{
c
p
− c(1− p)h , 0
})
+ o + pp(1+ (1− p)h)
·
(
αV − 2c
p(1− p)h
)
+ 2(1− p)(pαV − c);
ΠAL  p
(
V −max
{
c
p
− c(1− p)h , 0
})
+ o
+ pp(1+ (1− p)h)
(
αV − 2c
p(1− p)h
)
+ 2(1− p)o.
Under the no-help system (subscript N ), the firm’s payoffs
for the three scenarios—ΠHHN for high effort in both stages,
ΠHLN for high effort in the first stage only, and Π
LL
N for no
effort in either stage—are as stipulated in Proposition 1.
The conditions for each scenario can be derived via com-
parisons made among these payoffs under the condition
h(1 − p) ≥ p(2 − p), which ensures that c/p − c/h + pc/
((1− p)h) ≥ 0 and c/p − c/((1− p)h) ≥ 0.
In part 1, the company induces no individual effort in
the second stage when help is not available. Hence we have
(c + o)/(αp) > V (this condition is given in Proposition 1).
Furthermore, the thresholds for engagement strategies can
be derived as follows.
(a) High engagement is preferred when ΠHL ≥ ΠHLN and
ΠHL ≥ΠAL , which yield the respective thresholds
V1 
c + 2h(c + o)(1− p)2
αhp(1− p)2(1+ h(1− p)) and
V2 
pc + h(c + o)(1+ p − 6p2 + 4p3)
hp(1− p)(1+ α(1+ h(1− p))p(1− 2p)) .
(b) Asymmetric engagement is preferred when ΠAL ≥
ΠHL , ΠAL ≥ ΠHLN , and ΠAL ≥ ΠLLN . The first inequality
gives V2 as in (a). The second and third inequalities yield
thresholds
V3 
h(c + o)(1− 3p + 2p2) − cp
hp(1− p)(1− α(1+ h(1− p))p) and
V4 
pc + h(c + o)(1+ p − 2p2)
hp(1− p)(1+ αp(1+ h(1− p))) ,
respectively.
In part 2 of the proposition, the company induces indi-
vidual effort in the second stage when help is not available.
Under these circumstances, V > (c + o)/(αp) for all the cases
and the thresholds for engagement strategies are as listed
next.
(a) High engagement is preferred when ΠHH ≥ ΠAH and
ΠHH ≥ΠHHN , which give the thresholds
V5 
cp + h(c + o)(1− p)(1− 2p2)
h(1− p)p(1− αp(1− h(1− p)(1− 2p))) and
V6 
c + h(c + o)(1− p)2
αh2(1− p)3p ,
respectively.
(b) Asymmetric engagement is preferredwhenΠAH ≥ΠHH
and ΠAH ≥ΠHHN , from which follow the respective thresholds
V5 andV3.
Proof of Lemma 2
Under commitment, the company expands its portfolio if its
expected profit in t  0 under the most favorable conditions
(i.e., α  1 and V  (o + c)/p) is larger than in the no-help
system. In the former case, the firms earns
ΠAL |α1,V(o+c)/p  3o + (1+ hp)(1− p)o
+ cp
(
h(1− p) − 1
h(1− p) − 1
)
;
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in the latter case, it earns 4o. Therefore, the conditions for
portfolio expansion can be found by solving
3o + (1+ hp)(1− p)o + cp
(
h(1− p) − 1
h(1− p) − 1
)
≥ 4o ,
which gives h(1 − p) ≥ 12 (1 +
√(5c + o)/(c + o)) or h(1 − p) ≤
1
2 (1 −
√(5+ o)/(c + o)), where 12 (1 −√(5c + o)/(c + o)) < 0 for
o ≥ 0. Hence the only condition we need is h(1 − p) ≥ 12 (1 +√(5c + o)/(c + o)).
Back-loading occurs if and only if ΠAL > ΠHL and
ΠAL >ΠHLN . The condition h(1− p) < 12 (1+
√(5c + o)/(c + o))
implies that ΠAL |V(c+o)/p <ΠHLN |V(c+o)/p  4o and so there is
no back-loading. For h(1 − p) ≥ 12 (1 +
√(5c + o)/(c + o)), we
look at two scenarios:
1. ΠHL |α1,V(c+o)/p < 4o. In that case, the existence of
project portfolio expansion implies that ΠAL |α1,V(c+o)/p ≥
ΠHLN |V(c+o)/p  4o and thus back-loading exists.
2. ΠHL |α1,V(c+o)p ≥ 4o. In this case, Since ΠHL decreases
in α, we can find α∗  (c + 2h(c + o)(1 − p)2)/(h(c + o)(1 +
h(1 − p))(1 − p)2) such that ΠHL |αα∗ ,V(c+o)/p  4o. Then we
can show that ΠAL |αα∗ ,V(c+o)/p > ΠHL |αα∗ ,V(c+o)/p  4o and
back-loading exists.
Proof of Lemma 3
We first define the percentage increase as ρ  (ΠH −ΠN )/ΠN ,
where ΠH and ΠN are profits under (respectively) the help
system and the no-help system. The specific values of these
profits depend on which engagement strategy is adopted by
the company.
1. Assume that V ≤ (c + o)/p.
In this case there are two possible engagement strate-
gies, which lead to ρ1  (ΠHL −ΠLLN )/ΠLLN and ρ2  (ΠAL −
ΠLLN )/ΠLLN ; here the specific values of these profits are as
described in the proof of Proposition 3.
It is easy to verify that both ρ1 and ρ2 are strictly increas-
ing in V and α. Therefore, ρ1 ≤ (p(h(c + o)(h(1 − p) − 1) ·
(1 − p)2 − c))/(2ho(1 − p)) and ρ2 ≤ (p(h(o + c)(h(1 − p) − 1) ·
(1 − p) − c))/(4ho(1 − p)), which are the values at α  1 and
V  (c + o)/p. As a consequence,
ρ ≤max
{
p(h(c + o)(h(1− p) − 1)(1− p)2 − c)
2ho(1− p) ,
p(h(o + c)(h(1− p) − 1)(1− p) − c)
4ho(1− p)
}
.
2. Assume that V ≥ (c + o)/(αp).
In this case there are two possible increases: ρ3  (ΠHH −
ΠHHN )/ΠHHN and ρ4  (ΠAH −ΠHHN )/ΠHHN . We start with ρ3. The
first-order derivative of ρ3 with respect to V is
∂ρ3
∂V
 [p2(c(1+α(1+h(1−h(2−p))(1−p)2)(1−p)+h(1−p)2)
+ho(1−p)2(1+α(1−p)(1+hp)))]
·[h(1−p)(p(o+(1+α(1−p))V)−c(2−p))2]−1.
Note that ∂ρ3/∂V goes to zero only if V goes to infinity.
In other words, there is no interior value of V such that
∂ρ3/∂V  0. Hence the maximum value of ρ3 occurs either as
V→∞ for a given α or when V  (c + o)/(αp).
When V→∞, we have ρ3  αhp(1− p)2/(1+α(1− p)). This
quantity is greatest when α  1, from which it follows that
ρ3 ≤ (hp(1− p)2)/(2− p).
If instead ρ3 is greatest along the curve V  (c + o)/(αp),
then we substitute V  (c + o)/(αp) into the definition of ρ3
and take the first-order derivative over α. Now
∂ρ3
∂α

−(c + o)(c + h(c + o)(1− h(1− p))(1− p)2)p
h(1− p)(c + o − α(c − o))2 .
If c + h(c + o)(1− h(1− p))(1− p)2 < 0, then the maximum ρ3
can be found at α  1 and V  (c + o)/p; it is the same as
the upper bound of ρ1 found in part 1. If c + h(c + o)(1 − h ·
(1− p))(1− p)2 > 0, then ρ3 < 0 for all values of α and so help
would never be beneficial at V  (c + o)/(αp).
We follow the exact same procedure for ρ4. Again we
observe that ρ4 as a function of V is maximized either as
V→∞ or when V  (c + o)/(αp). In the former instance, ρ4 ≤
(αp(1+ h(1− p))− 1)/(2(1− α(1− p)) and this value is smaller
than (hp(1 − p)2)/(2 − p), the upper bound of ρ3 as V→∞.
In the latter instance, the maximum ρ4 can be found at α  1
andV  (c+ o)/p, which is the same as the bound of ρ2 found
in part 1.
3. Assume that (c + o)/p ≤ V < (c + o)/(αp).
In this case, the two possible increases are ρ5  (ΠHL −
ΠHLN )/ΠHLN and ρ6  (ΠAL − ΠHLN )/ΠHLN . The proof follows
the same procedure in part 2. Similarly, we observe that the
first-order derivatives of ρ5 and ρ6 with respect to V go to
zero only if V goes to infinity and therefore there are no
interior values of V that maximize ρ5 and ρ6, respectively.
Then, ρ5 and ρ6 are maximized either at V  (c + o)/p or
V  (c + o)/(αp). In the latter instance, the maximums of ρ5
and ρ6 can be found at α  1 and V  (c + o)/p, which are
the same in the former instance and also coincide with the
bounds of ρ3 and ρ4 found in part 2.
The bounds themselves are capped at (hp(1−p)2)/(2−p) ≤
0.5, at (p(h(c + o)(h(1− p) − 1)(1− p)2 − c))/(2ho(1− p)) ≤ ∞,
and at p((h(o + c)(h(1 − p) − 1)(2 − p) − c))/(4ho(1 − p)) ≤ ∞.
Solving (p(h(c + o)(h(1 − p) − 1)(1 − p)2 − c))/(2ho(1 − p)) ≤
(hp(1− p)2)/(2− p) now yields the condition o > (c(h(1− p)2 ·
(h(1 − p) − 1) − 1)(2 − p))/(h(1 − p)2(2 + p(h(1 − p) − 1))).
Solving (p(h(o + c)(h(1 − p) − 1)(2 − p) − c))/(4ho(1 − p)) ≤
(hp(1 − p)2)/(2 − p), we have the condition o > (c(h(1 − p) ·
(h(1− p)−1)−1)(2− p))/(h(1− p)(2− p+ h(1− p))(2−3p)). So
when
o >max
{
c(h(1− p)2(h(1− p) − 1) − 1)(2− p)
h(1− p)2(2+ p(h(1− p) − 1)) ,
c(h(1− p)(h(1− p) − 1) − 1)(2− p)
h(1− p)(2− p + h(1− p))(2− 3p)
}
,
we have ρ ≤ (hp(1− p)2)/(2− p).
Proof of Proposition 4
For the pooling policy, the companymust satisfy the following
constraints:
wr(p + (1− p)p ¯h) − c ≥max{w1p − c , 0},
wr(p + (1− p)p ¯h) − c ≥ wrp ,
wh(p + (1− p)p ¯h) − c ≥ whp.
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The first two constraints are for the troubled manager to call
for help and exert effort; the third is for the helping man-
ager to exert effort. Here the optimal w1  c/p. The optimal
incentives can be found in the binding constraints and are
given as
wPr 
c
p(1− p)
¯
h
and wPh 
c
p(1− p)
¯
h
.
For the shutdown policy, the firmmust satisfy the following
constraints:
wr(p + (1− p)ph¯) − c ≥max{w1p − c , 0},
wr(p + (1− p)ph¯) − c ≥ wrp ,
wh(p + (1− p)ph¯) − c ≥ whp ,
wr(p + (1− p)p ¯h) − c ≤max{w1p − c , 0}.
The new constraint ensures that the troubled manager does
not call for help when the complementarity of help is low. The
optimal incentives in this case are
wSr 
c
p(1− p)h¯ and w
S
h 
c
p(1− p)h¯ .
The last of these constraints requires that wSr  c/(p(1−p)h¯) ≤
c/(p + (1− p)p
¯
h), which holds only when (h¯ −
¯
h)(1− p) ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
We first find the optimal incentives for high and normal
efforts at t  1. Project manager i exerts high effort at t  1
if w1p(2 − p) − 2c ≥ w1p − c, which gives the optimal wage
wh1  c/(p(1−p)). Project manager i exerts normal effort at t 1
if w1p − c ≥ 0, which gives the optimal wage wn1  c/p. These
optimal wages will be used to determine the optimal effort
levels to induce, and also the optimal wages, in t  0.
1. In t  1, the company induces high effort if its expected
profit is then greater than under normal effort or no effort,
respectively,
p(2− p)(αV −wh1 ) ≥ p(αV −wn1 );
p(2− p)(αV −wh1 ) ≥ o.
Hence αV≥ c/(p(1−p)2) and αV≥(c+(c+o)(1−p))/(p(1−p)·
(2− p)) or, equivalently, αV ≥max{c/(p(1− p)2),(c+ (c+ o) ·
(1−p))/(p(1−p)(2−p))}.
Given high effort in t  1, project manager i exerts high
effort in t  0 if
w0p(2− p) − 2c + (1− p(2− p))(wh1 p(2− p) − 2c)
≥ w0p − c + (1− p)(wh1 p(2− p) − 2c),
and the optimalwage is wh0  c(1+ p2)/(p(1−p)). Projectman-
ager i exerts normal effort at t  0 if
w0p − c + (1− p)(wh1 p(2− p) − 2c) ≥ wh1 p(2− p) − 2c ,
and the optimal wage is wn0  c/p + cp/(1− p).
In t  0, the company induces high effort if its expected
profit is then greater than under normal effort or no effort,
respectively,
p(2− p)(V + o −wh0 )+ (1− p(2− p))p(2− p)(αV −wh1 )
≥ p(V + o −wn0 )+ (1− p)p(2− p)(αV −wh1 );
p(2− p)(V + o −wh0 )+ (1− p(2− p))p(2− p)(αV −wh1 )
≥ o + p(2− p)(αV −wh1 ).
From these expressions it follows that V ≥ (c(1−2p(1− p)2)−
o(1− p)2p)/(p(1− p)2(1− αp(2− p))) and V ≥ (c(2− p(5− 2p ·
(3 − p)) + o(1 − p)3)/(p(1 − p)(2 − p)(1 − αp(2 − p))) or,
equivalently,
V ≥max
{
c(1− 2p(1− p)2) − o(1− p)2p
p(1− p)2(1− αp(2− p)) ,
c(2− p(5− 2p(3− p))+ o(1− p)3
p(1− p)(2− p)(1− αp(2− p))
}
.
The company induces normal effort if its expected profit is
then greater than under high effort or no effort, respectively,
p(V + o −wn0 )+ (1− p)p(2− p)(αV −wh1 )
≥ p(2− p)(V + o −wh0 )+ (1− p(2− p))p(2− p)(αV −wh1 );
p(V + o −wn0 )+ (1− p)p(2− p)(αV −wh1 )
≥ o + p(2− p)(αV −wh1 ).
Thus we have (c(1 − 2p(1 − p)2) − o(1 − p)2p)/(p(1 − p)2(1 −
αp(2− p))) ≥ V ≥ ((c + o)(1− p) − cp)/(p(1− αp(2− p))).
2. In t  1, the company induces normal effort if its profit is
then greater than under high effort or no effort, respectively,
p(αV −wn1 ) ≥ p(2− p)(αV −wh1 );
p(αV −wn1 ) ≥ o.
Therefore, c/(p(1 − p)2) ≥ αV ≥ (c + o)/p. Note that this
inequality does not hold when o > (cp(2− p))/(1− p)2, and in
this case it is not optimal to induce normal effort in t  1.
Given normal effort at t  1, project manager i exerts high
effort at t  0 if
w0p(2− p) − 2c + (1− p(2− p))(wn1 p − c)
≥ w0p − c + (1− p)(wn1 p − c),
in which case the optimal wage is wh0  c/(p(1 − p)). Project
manager i exerts normal effort at t  0 if
w0p − c + (1− p)(wn1 p − c) ≥ wn1 p − c ,
and the optimal wage is wn0  c/p.
The company induces high effort at t  0 if its expected
profit is then greater than under normal effort or no effort,
respectively,
p(2− p)(V + o −wh0 )+ (1− p(2− p))p(αV −wn1 )
≥ p(V + o −wn0 )+ (1− p)p(αV −wn1 );
p(2− p)(V + o −wh0 )+ (1− p(2− p))p(αV −wn1 )
≥ o + p(αV −wn1 ).
These expressions imply that V≥(c(1−p(1−p)2)−o(1−p)2p)/
(p(1− p)2(1−αp)) and V ≥ (c(2− p)(1− p(1− p))+ o(1− p)3)/
(p(1−p)(2−p)(1−αp)) or, equivalently,
V ≥max
{
c(1− p(1− p)2) − o(1− p)2p
p(1− p)2(1− αp) ,
c(2− p)(1− p(1− p))+ o(1− p)3
p(1− p)(2− p)(1− αp)
}
.
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The company induces normal effort at t  0 if its expected
profit is then greater than under high effort or no effort,
respectively,
p(V+o−wn0 )+(1−p)p(αV−wn1 )≥p(2−p)(V+o−wh0 )
+(1−p(2−p))p(αV−wn1 );
p(V+o−wn0 )+(1−p)p(αV−wn1 )≥o+p(αV−wn1 ).
Hence (c(1− p(1− p)2) − o(1− p)2p)/(p(1− p)2(1− αp)) ≥ V ≥
(c + o)(1 − p)/(p(1 − αp)). Here, when o > cp(2− p)/(1− p)2,
the above condition does not hold; thus it is not optimal to
induce normal effort in t  0.
We conclude that, when o > cp(2− p)/(1− p)2, it is never
optimal to induce normal effort in t  0 or t  1.
3. In t 1, the company induces no effort if its profit is then
greater than under high effort or normal effort, respectively,
o ≥ p(2− p)(αV −wh1 ), o ≥ p(αV −wn1 ).
It follows that αV ≤ (c + (c + o)(1 − p))/(p(1 − p)(2 − p)) and
αV ≤ (c + o)/p or, equivalently, αV ≤min{(c + (c + o)(1− p))/
(p(1− p)(2− p)), (c + o)/p}.
Given no effort at t  1, project manager i exerts high effort
at t  0 if w0p(2− p) − 2c > w0p − c, which yields an optimal
wage of wh0  c/(p(1 − p)). Project manager i exerts normal
effort at t  0 if w0p − c > 0, which gives the optimal wage
wn0  c/p.
The company induces high effort at t  0 if its expected
profit is then greater than under normal effort or no effort,
respectively,
p(2− p)(V −wh0 )+ o ≥ p(V −wn0 )+ o ,
p(2− p)(V −wh0 )+ o ≥ o + o.
Therefore, V ≥ c/(p(1 − p)2) and V ≥ (c + (c + o)(1 − p))/
(p(1 − p)(2 − p)) or, equivalently, V ≥ max{c/p(1 − p)2 ,
(c + (c + o)(1− p))/(p(1− p)(2− p))}.
The company induces normal effort at t  0 if its expected
profit is then greater than under high effort or no effort,
respectively,
p(V −wn0 )+ o ≥ p(2− p)(V −wh0 )+ o ,
p(V −wn0 )+ o ≥ o + o;
these expressions yield c/(p(1− p)2) ≥ V ≥ (c + o)/p.
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose that, in t  1, one project manager is in trouble and
the other manager is available for help. Then the company
earns (p+ hp(1− p))(αV −2c/(hp(1− p))) if it induces cooper-
ation or earns p(2− p)(αV − c/(p(1− p)))+ o if it induces high
effort by the troubledmanager. The level of help complemen-
tarity h at which the firm prefers inducing cooperation to
inducing high effort is found by solving
(p+ hp(1− p))
(
αV − 2c
hp(1− p)
)
≥ p(2− p)
(
αV − c
p(1− p)
)
+ o.
Endnotes
1Here we have replaced the Puranam et al. generic term “task inter-
dependence”with themore specific term “project interdependence.”
2We generalize this binary effort setup in Section 5.2 by allowing for
high, normal, and no effort.
3 In Section 5.1 we incorporate the notion that h is random and
private information: whereas the firm has an expectation regard-
ing h, only the project managers observe the actual complementarity
of help.
4This assumption is in line with empirical PM evidence and also
accords with widely held conceptualizations (Adler et al. 1995, 1996;
Kwon et al. 2010). However, we verified that our model’s key insights
do not depend on it.
5Figure 2—and each subsequent figure—is parameterized with c  1
and o  0.25. This normalization is without loss of generality.
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